This case is on appeal from the Hocking County Court of Common Pleas where Mr. Heisler’s motion to modify a divorce decree allocating parental rights and responsibilities was dismissed.

A year after Mr. Heisler filed his motion, the parties reached an agreement, which was reduced to a handwritten entry signed by both parties. Mr. Heisler was ordered to present a formal agreed entry. Before Ms. Heisler received her copies, their son became subject to delinquency and truancy charges in Fairfield County Juvenile Court. Ms. Heisler then argued that, due to the action in Fairfield County Juvenile Court, that Hocking County had lost Jurisdiction to decide the motion to modify. The Hocking County Court of Common Pleas dismissed Mr. Heisler’s motion.

In his appeal, Mr. Heisler claims that the Hocking County Court of Common Pleas retained jurisdiction over the allocation of parental rights despite a pending delinquency matter in the Fairfield County Juvenile Court. The court held that the courts had concurrent jurisdiction and “where two courts have concurrent jurisdiction, the general rule is that the court where proceedings are first properly initiated acquired the right to adjudicate the matter to the exclusion of all other courts.” See State ex rel. Phillips v. Polcar (1977), 50 Ohio St. 2d 279, 364 N.E.2d 33.

From the Opinion:

A DR Court that enters an order allocating parental rights and responsibilities retains jurisdiction of ther those issues. R.C. 3109.06 provides, in part: “In any case in which a court of common pleas, or other court having jurisdiction, has issued an order that allocates parental rights and responsibilities for the care of minor children and designates their place of residence and legal custodian of minor children, has made an order…the jurisdiction of the courts shall not abate upon the death of the person awarded custody but shall continue for all purposes during the minority of the children. The court, upon its own motion or the motion of either parent or of any interested person acting on behalf of the children may proceed to make further disposition of the case in the best interests of the children and subject to sections 3109.42 to 3109.48 of the Revised Code.

But, somewhat contradictorily, a juvenile court obtains “exclusive original jurisdiction” concerning the custody of a child against whom delinquency is alleged. R.C. 2151.23(A). R.C. 2151.23(A)(1) and (2) provide that “[t]he juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction under the Revised Code as follows: (1) [c]oncerning any child who on or about the date specified in the complaint, indictment, or information is alleged *** to be a juvenile traffic offender or a delinquent, unruly, abused, neglected, or
dependent child *** to determine the custody of any child not a ward of another court of
this state[.]”

In In re Poling, 64 Ohio St.3d 211, 1992-Ohio-144, 594 N.E.2d 589, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that, despite the “not a ward of another court” language, a juvenile court may issue orders concerning the custody of a child who is the subject of a previous custody order contained in a separate domestic relations court’s divorce decree. Id. at syllabus. In effect, when a domestic relations court enters a decree addressing the allocation of parental rights and responsibilities concerning a child, the
child does not become a “ward” of the domestic relations court for purposes of R.C. 2151.23. Id. at 214. The Court further held that where a domestic relations court has entered a decree regarding the custody of the child, and the child later comes under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, the courts share “concurrent jurisdiction” over the custody of the child. Id. at 215.

Where courts share concurrent jurisdiction, the general rule is that the court where proceedings are first properly initiated acquires the right to adjudicate the matter to the exclusion of all other courts. See State ex rel. Phillips v. Polcar (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 279, 364 N.E.2d 33, at syllabus; Miller v. Court of Common Pleas (1944), 143 Ohio St. 68, 70, 54 N.E.2d 130. Under this rule, the domestic relations court, which first established jurisdiction through the divorce decree, would retain exclusive jurisdiction to entertain custody issues involving a child the subject of an earlier divorce decree in that court. But in Poling the Court held that the legislative scheme set forth in R.C. 2151.23 (requiring juvenile courts to determine custody matters in accordance with R.C. 3109.04) indicated that juvenile courts may nonetheless make “particularized determinations regarding the care and custody of children subject to its jurisdiction, while respecting the continuing jurisdiction of the domestic relations or common pleas court that makes a custody decision in a divorce case.” Poling at 216.

The Trial Court did not address the more troubling issue of what happens when a juvenile court and a domestic relations court, possessing concurrent jurisdiction over the issues of custody and allocation of parental rights, both assert jurisdiction and then enter different, potentially conflicting orders. But we need not address that quandary. We are only faced with the question of whether Hocking County retained jurisdiction over the support matters addressed in the Memorandum Entry. And based on Poling, we hold that it did. Fairfield County Juvenile Court shares concurrent jurisdiction over the issue of custody by virtue of the delinquency charges. But this action did not divest Hocking County of the ability to modify its existing divorce decree.

Read more about it in this article: “Jury says attorney committed malpractice.”

A dedicated attorney who is in it for the client and not the bottom line is your ticket to a successful adoption.  Please call the experienced adoption attorneys at Mark Godbey & Associates for a free initial consultation.

Mark E. Godbey, Attorney at Law
Mark E. Godbey & Associates
708 Walnut Street, Suite 600
Cincinnati, Ohio 45202
(513) 241 – 6650 phone
(513) 241 – 6649 fax

This article was written by attorney Mark E. Godbey. For more information, please visit our web site at www.GodbeyLaw.com or call our office at 513-241-6650.

These new changes could have significant effects on you and your children, as well as the amount of total child support that you are entitled to receive, or are required to pay. If you have questions regarding this change in the law, please call our offices for a FREE initial consultation.

For more information on these changes, brought to you directly by the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services, please click here: http://jfs.ohio.gov/Ocs/CashMedical.stm.

Blake P. Somers, Attorney at Law
Mark E. Godbey & Associates
708 Walnut Street, Suite 600
Cincinnati, Ohio 45202
(513) 241 – 6650 phone
(513) 241 – 6649 fax

This article was written by attorney Blake P. Somers. For more information, please visit our web site at www.GodbeyLaw.com or call our office at 513-241-6650.

The issue before both Courts was whether grandparents should be allowed to intervene in a petition to involuntarily terminate their children’s parental rights over their grandchildren. In both cases motions had been filed to sever parental rights and the concerned grandparents cited Civil Rule 24 (Intervention) as the rule allowing them to become a party. In both cases, the trial
court denied intervention.

Ohio Civ. R. 24(A) and Kentucky CR 24.01 are identical and allow an interested party to intervene as a matter of right when a person has an interest relating to the subject matter of anaction and is so situated that disposition of the action may impair or impede such person’s ability to protect that interest. The Kentucky Court of Appeals held that grandparents can intervene
while the Ohio Court of Appeals denied the grandparents requested relief. The difference in the decision is an insight as to how the states will treat the rights of grandparents.

In Kentucky, grandparents “rights” have been recognized both by statute and case law. Pursuant to KRS 405.021, grandparent visitation statutorily survives termination of parental rights if established before such termination and is not contrary to the best interests of the child. In Ohio, the standard is much higher. In order for grandparents to intervene, they must have exercised
significant control over, or assumed parental duties for the benefit of their grandchildren.

Read the full opinions: Click here for Ohio Opinion, Click here for Kentucky Opinion

Mark E. Godbey & Associates
708 Walnut Street, Suite 600
Cincinnati, Ohio 45202
(513) 241 – 6650 phone
(513) 241 – 6649 fax